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MEDIA REPORTING OF JURY VERDICTS:
IS THE TAIL (OF THE DISTRIBUTION)
WAGGING THE DOG?
Robert J. MacCount
INTRODUCTION
Several decades back, a series of articles and books by the newly
emerging law-and-economics community articulated the principles of
rational litigation behavior. 2 Litigation involves a series of decisions.
First, potential defendants have to decide whether to take actions that
could expose them to future litigation. Second, plaintiffs who believe
they have been injured by such actions have to decide whether to file
a lawsuit. Third, defendants have to decide on a settlement offer. Fi-
nally, plaintiffs have to decide whether to accept that offer or go to
trial. Law-and-economics models of these four decisions share a com-
mon parameter: The expected value of a jury verdict if a lawsuit goes
to trial.
There are reasons to doubt that rational-actor models provide a
valid description of actual litigant behavior.3 But even a boundedly
rational psychological model will assume that expectations play a cen-
tral role in choice.
The problem, even for the most rational of actors, is that the ex-
pected value of the trial verdict is not a given. It must be estimated by
the actor. Yet there is no simple way to just "look it up"-no expert
system, spreadsheet algorithm, or actuarial table. Indeed, until 1981,
no one had systematically estimated the mean or median jury award
1. Robert J. MacCoun, Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law and Goldman School of
Public Policy, University of California at Berkeley.
Prepared for the 11th Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy, Who Feels
Their Pain? The Challenge of Non-Economic Damages in Civil Litigation, DePaul University
College of Law, April 15, 2005. Earlier versions were presented at Duke University's Fuqua
School of Business and at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Experimental Social Psychol-
ogy, Ft. Worth Texas, October 15, 2004. I thank Chip Heath (Stanford) for encouragement and
advice, and Sean Farhang for very helpful comments on the first draft.
2. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcONOMICS (2000).
3. See Robert J. MacCoun et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution in Trial and Appellate Courts,
in THE HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 95 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds., 1992);
Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by
Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 123 (1980-81).
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for any jurisdiction. Until the 1980s, there was no government
equivalent of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports or the prison statistics
accumulated by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. At best, some com-
munities had "Jury Verdict Reports"-brief synopses of recent, local
trials compiled and marketed to attorneys practicing in some cities.
In the early 1980s, Mark Peterson and his colleagues at RAND's
Institute for Civil Justice (ICJ) used information from published jury
verdict reporters in Cook County, Illinois, to compile the first, system-
atic statistical database on civil jury trial characteristics and verdicts.4
Since that time, the ICJ has maintained a long-term time series on
trends in Cook County and in California.5 Similar databases with
shorter time spans but broader geographic coverage have been assem-
bled and analyzed by the ICJ,6 by Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin
at the American Bar Foundation, 7 and by Brian Ostrom and David
Rottman of the National Center for State Courts.8 Today the federal
government distributes civil jury data. 9 Yet even today, there is no
simple way to statistically forecast the expected value of any given
case-the published data are inevitably dated, and they do not readily
permit one to project the combined effects of case type, jurisdiction,
and injury characteristics, much less a host of other potentially rele-
vant factors not coded by the researchers.
In the absence of good actuarial estimates, what is a litigant or liti-
gator to do? Drawing on insights from the psychological literature on
judgment under uncertainty, Dan Bailis and I concluded that people
probably cobbled together rough inductions from a mix of personal
4. Audrey Chin & Mark A. Peterson, Deep Pockets, Empty Pockets: Who Wins in Cook
County Jury Trials (Rand Corp., Inst. for Civil Justice No. R-3249-ICJ, 1985); Mark Peterson,
Compensation of Injuries: Civil Jury Verdicts in Cook County (Rand Corp., Inst. for Civil Justice
No. RR-301 1-ICJ, 1984); Mark A. Peterson & George L. Priest, The Civil Jury: Trends in Trials
and Verdicts in Cook County, Illinois, 1960-1979 (Rand Corp., Inst. for Civil Justice No.
R-3011-ICJ, 1982); Mark A. Peterson et al., Punitive Damages: Empirical Findings (Rand
Corp., Inst. for Civil Justice No. R-3311-ICJ, 1987); Michael G. Shanley & Mark A. Peterson,
Comparative Justice: Civil Jury Verdicts in San Francisco and Cook Counties (Rand Corp., Inst.
for Civil Justice No. R-3006-ICJ, 1983).
5. Seth A. Seabury et al., Forty Years of Civil Jury Verdicts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1
(2004).
6. Erik Moller, Trends in Civil Jury Verdicts: New Data from 15 Jurisdictions (Rand Corp.,
Inst. for Civil Justice No. MR-694-ICJ, 1996).
7. STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM
(1995).
8. See Brian J. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990s,
79 JUDICATURE 223 (1995-1996); see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive
Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2002).
9. See, e.g., Thomas H. Cohen & Steven K. Smith, Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large
Countries, 2001, in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN (U.S. Department of Justice, No.
NCJ 202803, 2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ctculcol.pdf.
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experience, local anecdotes, and media reporting. We also wondered
whether distorted media coverage might play a role in the widespread
view that jury awards were out of control. Despite the persistent com-
plaints of tort reformers, it was already clear by the mid-1980s that
median awards were modest and that fairly large awards were a rare
event.' 0 We thus set out to systematically document what kind of im-
pression one might form about the expected value of a jury verdict on
the basis of popular and business media coverage.1
As described below, our findings and those of subsequent studies
document a remarkable pattern of distortion. If one were to use the
media as a basis for estimating the expected value of a jury verdict,
one would grossly overestimate the likelihood that the case would go
to trial, the plaintiff's probability of victory, and the magnitude of the
award. Moreover, one would form the mistaken impression that tort
litigation mostly involves medical malpractice and product liability
rather than automobile negligence cases.
Our study soon found a place in the growing academic literature
critiquing the empirical assertions of the tort reform movement. 12
Seeing our findings repeatedly discussed and cited, I observed that
many other authors either implicitly or explicitly endorsed two infer-
ences: (1) The media distortion reflects the influence of powerful cor-
porate interests favoring a tort reform agenda; and (2) the media
distortion itself successfully advances that agenda. Only recently have
I begun to question these highly plausible assumptions. In this essay, I
will question both of them. I will suggest that (1) the media distortion
may be parsimoniously explained by the intersection of an asymmetri-
cal, skewed outcome distribution combined with human brains that
selectively attend to stimuli on the basis of extremity, valence, and
narrative structure; and (2) the media distortion may be at least partly
10. ROBERT J. MACCOUN, GETTING INSIDE THE BLACK Box: TOWARD A BETTER UNDER-
STANDING OF CIVIL JURY BEHAVIOR (1987). The longest jury-verdict time series, from Cook
County and San Francisco, suggests an increase in the mean award (which is more sensitive to
large awards) over the past three decades, but this appears largely attributable to changes in case
mix and medical losses. See Seabury et al., supra note 5.
11. D.S. Bailis & Robert MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Media as Your Guide:
A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort Litigation, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 419 (1996).
12. See, e.g., DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 7; NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND
THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTH ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS,
AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS (1995); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to
Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion,
46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); Robert J. MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research
Tells Us About Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM
137 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Be-
havior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).
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counterproductive for tort reformers because it conveys descriptive,
normative information that is at odds with its injunctive normative
message-the distortion may even encourage litigation.
II. PATTERNS OF DISTORTION IN MEDIA COVERAGE OF TORT
LITIGATION
The 1996 Bailis and MacCoun content analysis is based on a sample
of 249 articles that mentioned tort litigation or lawsuits and were pub-
lished between 1980 and 1990 in five popular news and business
magazines: Time, Newsweek, Fortune, Forbes, and Business Week. We
coded the date, type of tort, whether the case went to trial, whether
the defendant was found liable, and the size of the award. We also
coded any evaluative comments made by the authors. In order to as-
sess the representativeness of the cases covered in popular media cov-
erage, we computed the frequency of each tort type as well as the trial
rate, plaintiff victory rate, and median and mean award sizes. We
compared these to the best available archival sources on claiming, liti-
gation, trial rates, plaintiff victories, and jury awards.
As seen in Table 1, compared with objective data on tort cases, the
magazine articles considerably overrepresented the relative frequency
of controversial forms of litigation (product liability and medical mal-
practice), the proportion of disputes resolved by trial (rather than set-
tlement), and the plaintiff victory rate at trial.
TABLE 1
ACTUAL AND MEDIA-REPORTED ACCIDENT, FILING,
AND TRIAL RATES
1 3
Auto Products Medical
Actual accident rates 18% 30% 1%
Actual tort filings 60% 4% 7%
Actual trial rates 42% 3% 10%
Magazine coverage 2% 49% 25%
13. Bails & MacCoun, supra note 11, at tbl.2.
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TABLE 2
ACTUAL V. MEDIA-REPORTED PLAINTIFF VICTORY RATES
AND MEAN AND MEDIAN JURY AWARDS
14
Pltf. Mean Median
Tort Win Award Award
Source Location/Period Type(s) Rate ($1000s) ($1000s)
DeFrances et al. (1995) 75 state courts, All torts 50% 408 51
1992 Products 40% 727 260
Med. mal. 30% 1,484 201
Eisenberg, Goerdt, Federal courts, All torts 46% 1,196 136
Ostrom, & Rottman 1979-93 Products 30% 1,547 318
(1995) Med. mal. 27% 1,663 267
Peterson (1987) Cook County, IL, Products 52% 828 187
1980-84 Med. mal. 49% 1,179 121
Peterson (1987) San Francisco, Products 52% 1,105 200
1980-84 Med. mal. 53% 1,162 156
Daniels & Martin (1993) 6 Calif. Counties, Products 55% 1,085 294
1970-90
GAO (1989) AZ, MA, MO, Products 45% 845 157
ND, & SC,
1983-85
Magazine coverage 5 national All torts 85% 5,861 1,750
sample magazines,
1980-1990
And as seen in Table 2, the pattern of distortion was even more
striking for plaintiff win rates and for jury awards. Fully eighty-five
percent of the magazine cases involved plaintiff victories compared to
win rates ranging from twenty-seven to fifty-five percent in actual tort
trials; the exaggeration is even greater when one considers that the
magazine stories overrepresent product and medical malpractice
cases, which actually have lower than average plaintiff win rates. The
mean magazine award was a full order of magnitude higher than the
most representative estimate for state courts-almost $6 million as
compared to about $400,000. The median magazine-reported award
was three orders of magnitude higher-$1.7 million vs. $51,000.
While our paper was in press, a similar comparison of reported
awards was discussed independently by Oscar Chase. 15 The same
qualitative pattern of media distortion has been replicated by Steve
14. Id. at tbl.3.
15. Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 763 (1995).
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Garber and Anthony Bower1 6 for automotive product liability
coverage, by Neal Feigenson and Dan Bailis17 for coverage of airbag
safety and litigation, and by Laura Beth Nielsen and Aaron Beim 18 for
Title VII discrimination litigation. William Haltom and Michael
McCann' 9 have recently published the most ambitious book-length
study, with a much more extensive sample, a more detailed analysis of
content, and a very compelling discussion of the political and
institutional factors at play.
Since the pathbreaking studies of Kahneman and Tversky in the
1970s, it is now well established that when assessing probabilities,
people give undue weight to those cases that come most readily to
mind due to recency, saliency, or ease of recollection. 20 It is also well
known that media exposure can render certain issues or outcomes
more "available" than others; and indeed, Bailis and I argued that this
was a likely consequence of the distortions we uncovered. There are
many examples in the literature. The classic early work was a content
analysis of newspaper reporting on causes of death, conducted by
Barbara Combs and Paul Slovic. 2 ' Across various causes of death,
they found that annual death rates were only weakly correlated with
media attention-there was a strong emphasis on "catastrophic"
events involving large numbers of deaths in a single incident. A
similar pattern is seen in media coverage of crime, where violent
16. Steven Garber & Anthony G. Bower, Newspaper Coverage of Automotive Product-
Liability Verdicts, 33 LAW AND Soc'Y REV. 93 (2000). Garber and Bower's study is especially
significant because it used a different methodology that complements the one used by Bailis and
MacCoun, Feigenson and Bailis, and Nielsen and Beim. Rather than sampling cases from the
media and comparing them to court data, Garber and Bower sampled automotive product
liability cases in the 1985-1996 period (259 defense verdicts, 67 plaintiff verdicts) and then
searched media databases for coverage of the trials. They found several significant predictors of
coverage, including high damages (especially in excess of $1 million), the interaction of high
damages and local metropolitan area, cases with punitive damages, and cases with at least one
fatality.
17. Neil R. Feigenson & Daniel S. Bailis, Air Bag Safety: Media Coverage, Popular
Conceptions, and Public Policy, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 444 (2001).
18. Laura Beth Nielsen & Aaron Beim, Media Misrepresentation: Title VII, Print Media, and
Public Perceptions of Discrimination Litigation, 15 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 237 (2004).
19. WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND
THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004).
20. HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich
et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter HEURISTICS AND BIASES]; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 ScI. 1124 (1974).
21. ELEANOR SINGER & PHYLLIS M. ENDRENY, REPORTING ON RISK: HOW THE MASS MEDIA
PORTRAY ACCIDENTS, DISEASES, DISASTERS, AND OTHER HAZARDS (1993); Paul Slovic et al.,
Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Paul Slovic, Perception of
Risk, 236 ScI. 280 (1987); see Barbara Combs & Paul Slovic, Newspaper Coverage of Causes of
Death, 56 JOURNALISM Q. 837 (1979).
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crimes are grossly overrepresented. 22 Slovic and his colleagues found
that when actual mortality rates are controlled, there is an almost
perfect positive correlation between the frequency of news coverage
and people's estimates of the riskiness of each activity. Thus, people
mistakenly believe that death by fire is more common than by
diabetes, and that death by homicide is more common than by
stomach cancer, when in fact the diseases are considerably more
prevalent than more graphically violent forms of death.23
At this point, the fact of media distortion is well established. My
interest in this essay is understanding why it occurs and what that
might tell us. I consider five classes of explanations: two involving the
motivations of the source (the media), two involving the motivations
of the audience, and a final account that is more cognitive and
perceptual than motivational.
III. COMPETING EXPLANATIONS: SOURCE MOTIVATION
There is a veritable cottage industry-actually more of a big busi-
ness-in denouncing the political bias of the American mass media.
A Google search of the phrase "media bias" turned up nearly two
million web links.24 Of course, the problem is that the denouncers
hold two diametrically opposed views: that the media are too liberal25
and that the media have a right-wing slant.26 It is difficult to casually
adjudicate this dispute because of differences in the way one can oper-
ationalize concepts like media, bias, and ideology, and because au-
thors tend to cherry pick examples to prove their point.27 Moreover,
psychological research shows that partisans on both sides of a dispute
tend to see the exact same media coverage as favoring their oppo-
nents' position-the "hostile media phenomenon.1 28 But, for our pur-
22. See, e.g., Robert MacCoun, Legal Issues: Public Opinion, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 8641 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Balles
eds., 2001).
23. Slovic et al., supra note 21.
24. Google.com, http://www.google.com (search "media bias") (last visited Dec. 2, 2005).
25. See, e.g., L. BRENT BOZELL III, WEAPONS OF MASS DISTORTION: THE COMING
MELTDOWN OF THE LIBERAL MEDIA (2004); BERNARD GOLDBERG, BIAS: A CBS INSIDER Ex-
POSES HOW THE MEDIA DISTORTS THE NEWS (2003).
26. See, e.g., ERIC ALTERMAN, WHAT LIBERAL MEDIA?: THE TRUTH ABOUT BIAS AND THE
NEWS (2003); EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE PO-
LITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA (2002).
27. See Robert MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research Results, 49 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 259 (1998).
28. William P. Eveland & Dhavan V. Shah, The Impact of Individual and Interpersonal Fac-
tors on Perceived News Media Bias, 24 POL. PSYCHOL. 101 (2003); Roger Ginger-Sorolla &
Shelly Chaiken, The Causes of Hostile Media Judgments, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 165
(1994); Robert P. Vallone et al., The Hostile Media Phenomenon: Biased Perception and Percep-
2006]
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poses, the main point is that any accusation of right-wing media bias
needs to confront plausible counterarguments for left-wing media
bias.
A. Is There a Right-Wing Bias in the Media?
In presenting these results over the years, I have found that many
audiences-especially university students and faculty-take the find-
ings on their face as evidence of a procorporate bias in the media.
The argument is easily articulated, but hard to test. First, there has
been a long and aggressive corporate campaign for tort reform, con-
tending that juries are irrational and arbitrary and that jury awards
must be curtailed or eliminated. Second, the news media are mostly
owned by large corporations, and the increasing concentration of the
media in the hands of a few large conglomerates has reduced journal-
istic independency and norms of objectivity. 29 In conclusion, media
coverage of tort cases gets distorted in ways that advance the corpo-
rate tort reform campaign.
The first two propositions are demonstrably correct, and the conclu-
sion may have facial validity for many people-at least on the left.
But the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises. The
argument establishes motive, but not intent. And it fails to consider
other explanations for the distortion.
For reasons I will give below, I do not believe a right-wing or
procorporate bias is the most compelling explanation for the statistical
misrepresentation in tort coverage. But there is no doubt that the sta-
tistical distortion is often accompanied by slanted coverage of the ar-
guments for and against tort reform. Bailis and I found that in
magazine stories, explicitly evaluative comments were fairly rare. But
where they appeared; they were almost exclusively critical of the tort
system: Thirteen percent of the articles mentioned potentially harm-
ful consequences for the economy; ten percent suggested that Ameri-
cans are too litigious, and ten percent argued that lawyers' fees are too
high.30 We were only able to find two articles with a favorable state-
ment about juries, and only one that suggested the tort system was
working correctly.3'
tions of Media Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 577
(2003).
29. See generally BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE NEw MEDIA MONOPOLY (2004).
30. Bailis & MacCoun, supra note 11.
31. Haltom and McCann revisited this question more comprehensively in their study. Some-
what surprisingly, in an analysis of the subset of articles focusing on specific cases (rather than
tort reform more generally), they actually found slightly more statements favoring plaintiffs
(forty-three percent of evaluative remarks) than favoring defendants (thirty-five percent). They
[Vol. 55:539
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B. A Left-Wing Media Bias?
It is intriguing that sociolegal scholars have been quick to assume a
conservative media bias in tort reporting without seriously considering
the possibility that there is a left-wing slant favoring large awards.
Who should be more likely to disproportionately highlight cases in
which corporations were found negligent by citizen fact finders-a
conservative or a liberal? And there is also evidence that a majority
of practicing journalists are Democrats and tend to have centrist to
left-of-center personal views.32 Are journalists playing "gotcha"-
highlighting the most egregious forms of misconduct by powerful
monied interests?
This argument has an appeal of its own, but also some problems.
First, the argument works better for suits against corporations en-
gaged in commercial activities than for individual physicians accused
of malpractice. Granted, the American Medical Association (AMA)
is a fairly conservative organization, but it is difficult to see why liberal
journalists would have a political motive for going after individual
physicians. Second, the argument leaves unexplained the popularity
of media "tort tales," plaintiff victories that, as described, seem absurd
on their face: the McDonalds coffee case; the psychic who blamed a
CAT scan for destroying her telepathic skills; the injured robbers, bur-
glars, and carjackers who sued their victims. 33 I will argue below that
such cases are explicable without recourse to political bias, but if a
political bias is involved, it is surely more likely to be right- than left-
wing.
suggest that this near equivalence may partly reflect a journalistic attempt to provide balance via
offsetting quotes. Even in this subsample, Haltom and McCann reported a higher rate of evalua-
tive remarks of either kind than we reported in 1996. This could result from any number of
differences between the studies, including the choice of time periods, media covered, search
terms, and coding procedures.
32. In a 2004 poll, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found that thirty-
four percent of the national press consider themselves liberal, fifty-four percent moderate, and
seven percent conservative, vs. twenty, forty-one, and thirty-three percent, respectively, among
the general public. Pew Research Center, Bottom-Line Pressures Now Hurting Coverage, Say
Journalists (May 23, 2004). In a 1996 poll of reporters at sixty-one newspapers, sixty-one percent
described their political leaning as "liberal," twenty-four percent "independent/other," and only
fifteen percent "conservative." See PAUL S. VOLKES, THE NEWSPAPER JOURNALISTS OF THE
'90s (1997), available at http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?id=2980 (click on "The Journalists").
33. Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice Sys-
tem, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998); see Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the
Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, 52 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 269 (1989).
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IV. COMPETING EXPLANATIONS: AUDIENCE MOTIVATION
A. Just Providing What Readers Want?
Political accounts of right- and left-wing bias imply that the motiva-
tions of the sources drive media coverage. But of course, media out-
lets are for-profit enterprises operating in a market, so it is not
unreasonable to counter that the media may simply give us what we
want. The economic analysis of media markets is complex. In a truly
competitive market for a single commodity, consumers might reign
sovereign. But media markets are highly segmented with respect to
products, outlets, and audience demographics. 34 Moreover, the right-
wing bias theory contends that the media form oligopolies (and in
some markets, near monopolies), reducing their responsiveness to
consumer desires. So the "giving us what we want" account is too
simplistic, and even if it were true, it leaves the extent and pattern of
media distortion of tort cases unexplained, shifting the puzzle from
the question of source motivation to the question of audience
motivation.
B. Audience Fear of Liability Losses?
It is tempting to view the concern over very large awards as "irra-
tional." Bailis and I implied as much in our 1996 paper, and others
have voiced that view as well. For example, in the early 1990s,
Thomas Koenig and Michael Rustad systematically documented just
how extremely rare punitive damage awards really are, especially
blockbuster punitives.35 For tort reform critics, this was seen as clear
evidence that reform advocates were being either foolish or
duplicitous.
It is well established that people overweigh salient or vivid cases
when estimating risks.36 This "availability heuristic" may well have
evolved because it is (or once was) generally adaptive.37 But it does
seem safe to say that it is at least irrational to rely on reports of block-
buster awards if one is trying to estimate the central tendency of the
34. JAMES T. HAMILTON, ALL THE NEWS THAT'S FIT TO SELL: How THE MARKET TRANS-
FORMS INFORMATION INTO NEWS (2004).
35. See Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, The Quiet Revolution Revisited: An Empirical
Study of the Impact of State Tort Reform of Punitive Damages in Products Liability, 16 JUST. SYs.
J. 21 (1993); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269 (1993).
36. See HEURISTICS & BIASES, supra note 20; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 20.
37. GERD GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING: RATIONALITY IN THE REAL WORLD (2000);
see also BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard
Selten eds., 2001).
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distribution-the "expected value" needed in the law-and-economic
accounts of litigation rationality. This is particularly true if there are
more representative data sources available.
There are other reasons, however, why one might focus on the un-
representative tails of a distribution, reasons that are defensible under
some accounts of rationality. In the decision theory tradition, atti-
tudes toward risk are exogenous parameters of a rational model and
cannot themselves be judged as either rational or irrational so long as
the parameters are used coherently to derive a choice from inputs.38
From the coherence perspective, there is nothing inherently irrational
about extreme risk aversion. 39
Thus, a disproportionate focus on extreme outcomes may simply re-
flect extreme risk aversion. In lay terms, the perceiver is not trying to
estimate the typical (median), average (mean), or most likely (mode)
award; the perceiver is trying to anticipate worst-case (or for plaintiffs,
best-case) scenarios. Lola Lopes40 and James March 41 have promoted
psychological models of choice in which people strive to balance a
concern with expected values and a concern with extreme outcomes.
Indeed, surveys of corporate managers reveal that they frequently fo-
cus on worst-case scenarios in making choices; they are reluctant to
take actions that could potentially jeopardize their firm's (or their
own) survival-even if the expected value of the gamble looks
profitable.42
The equivalent concept in game theory is the minimax principle:
Choose the option that has the least-bad worst-case outcome.43 John
Rawls famously used this principle to defend his theory of the justice
38. George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON.
REV. 76 (1977). On the coherence-correspondence distinction, see Kenneth R. Hammond, Co-
herence and Correspondence Theories in Judgment and Decision Making, in JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER (T. Connolly et al. eds, 2000).
39. A similar argument can be made for the "arationality" of extreme myopia, at least with
respect to the exponential discounting posited by economists. The form of time discounting that
psychologists believe actually describes choice-hyperbolic discounting-is harder to defend be-
cause it leads to intertemporal preference reversals. See GEORGE AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF
WILL (2001).
40. See, e.g., Lola L. Lopes & Greg C. Oden, The Role of Aspiration Level in Risky Choice: A
Comparison of Cumulative Prospect Theory and SPIA Theory, 43 J. MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOL.
286 (1999).
41. RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963);
James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI.
1404 (1987).
42. March & Shapira, supra note 41.
43. See DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAFFIA: GAMES AND DECISIONS (1957). Many authors
use the term "maximin" rather than "minimax"; the terms are interchangeable and differ only in
whether one is describing the column player or the row player in a game matrix.
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principles people would adopt in the "original position," operating be-
hind a veil of ignorance. 44 Shrader-Frechette used a similar perspec-
tive to defend risk regulation policies that strike many economists,
from an expected value perspective, as grossly inefficient if not so-
cially irrational. 45 And most recently, environmentalists have champi-
oned-and sometimes written into law-a "precautionary principle"
in which global responses cannot wait for solid proof of looming eco-
logical crises. 46
So perhaps the media are indeed giving people exactly the informa-
tion they want-the tail of the distribution rather than its central ten-
dency. One could test this empirically using an information search
paradigm: Let consumers click a button to indicate which information
they most want-the mean award, the median award, or the upper
quartile (described in lay terms)-and make the choice costly with re-
spect to time or some other currency so they do not simply choose
everything. One could vary their goals by assigning them specific
roles such as consumer, corporate risk manager, or injured person. A
complementary experiment would provide consumers with one of
these distributional features, assigned randomly, to see how it affected
their judgments about a hypothetical course of action (going forward
with a product, filing a lawsuit, settling before trial).
Without knowing what such studies would reveal, it is unclear
whether this "minimax" account describes the citizenry as a whole.
Why should ordinary citizens fear large awards against product manu-
facturers, or against physicians? Citizens may fear the "trickle down"
effect on prices, product availability, and insurance premiums, but if
those factors are affected by tort awards, they are surely affected by
the whole distribution, not just the tail. At any rate, media consumers
and corporate actors are not discrete sets; the readers of the Wall
Street Journal, Forbes, Fortune, and Business Week are likely to be citi-
zens who work for corporations. So at least some consumers may
want to know what the worst case awards look like. Indirect support
for this view comes from Garber and Bower's finding that cases that
were both local and involved high damages were particularly likely to
receive media coverage, though this finding is also consistent with the
44. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
45. See K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK AND RATIONALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
FOR POPULIST REFORMS (1991).
46. For more on the "precautionary principle," see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BE-
YOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005); David Appell, The New Uncertainty Principle,
284 SCI. AM. 18 (2001); Kenneth R. Foster et al., Science and the Precautionary Principle, 288
Sci. 979 (2000); Wikipedia.com, Precautionary Principle, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precau-
tionary-principle (last visited Nov. 26, 2005).
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alternative account offered below.47 Still, if readers were using the
media to monitor their own liability risk, one would expect greater
coverage of suits against individual defendants.
C. Citizen Vigilance Over Powerful Corporate Actors?
Another possibility is roughly the audience equivalent of the "left-
biased source" account. The idea is that citizens look to the media to
keep them informed of potentially dangerous misbehavior by power-
ful corporations. This argument has a lot going for it. Consumer
watchdog stories are now a staple of the print, radio, and TV media.
The argument would also explain the disproportionate focus on medi-
cal malpractice and product liability cases-domains where people
may feel they have less control than "slip-and-fall" and automobile
domains.48 Moreover, at least when serving on a jury, citizens do ap-
pear to hold corporations to higher standards of conduct than they
apply to individuals.49
Yet there are also some problems with this account. It is difficult to
reconcile the argument that citizens are ever on the alert for corporate
negligence, when in fact seriously injured accident victims rarely even
consider filing a claim against a corporation.50 Indeed, the injured
mostly blame themselves, and they are more likely to blame someone
else in auto accidents-the other driver-than in product- or
medicine-related accidents.51 And if we are eagerly monitoring cor-
porate misconduct, why are so many specific tort accounts about pa-
tently irrational (according to the telling) jury verdicts-the so-called
"tort tales"? 52
D. A Nonmotivational Account. Formal Stimulus Properties and
the Brain
Though I once endorsed a more political view of media distortion,
upon closer examination I have come to conclude that politics may
play little role in the news media's dissemination of distorted tort sta-
47. Garber & Bower, supra note 16.
48. Robert MacCoun, Blaming Others to a Fault?, 6 CHANCE 31 (1993).
49. See generally VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY (2000); see also Robert J. MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate De-
fendants by Juries: An Examination of the "Deep-Pockets" Hypothesis, 30 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 121
(1996).
50. Deborah R. Henlser et al., Compensation for Accidental Injuries: Research Design and
Methods (Rand Corp., Inst. for Civil Justice N-2320-HHS/ICJ, 1990).
51. MacCoun, supra note 48.
52. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 19; see Daniels, supra note 33; see also Galanter, supra
note 33.
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tistics. This distortion may well be welcomed enthusiastically by tort
reformers, 53 but it is not necessarily produced with that as the aim.
Here is my argument in a nutshell:
(1) journalists sample cases for their interest value, not their statis-
tical representativeness;
(2) our brains have evolved to give disproportionate weight to ex-
treme stimuli;
(3) jury awards are distributed asymmetrically, bounded at zero on
the left but unbounded in the right tail;
(4) as a result, very large awards will attract interest, but very small
awards will not;
(5) because product liability, medical malpractice, and class action
cases produce more extremity, they will be overrepresented in
the set of attention-grabbing cases;
(6) and because only plaintiff victories produce extreme awards,
plaintiff victories will be overrepresented in the set of attention-
grabbing cases, relative to defense verdicts.
I will also argue that other newsworthy (and even politicized) out-
come distributions do not share this asymmetry.
1. The Asymmetric Distribution
I start with a statistical observation long familiar to jury researchers:
the distribution of jury awards is highly asymmetric. 54 It is bounded
on the low end at zero-awards cannot be negative-but effectively
unbounded at the upper end. As a result, awards data have a strong
positive skew; most awards pile up at the low end of the distribution,
there is a long "right tail" of occasional very large awards, the median
is smaller than the mean, and indeed most awards are lower than the
mean award. See Figures la and lb for a stylistic example.
These features of the award distribution play a key role in the re-
cent work by Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and Cass Sunstein
on punitive-damage decisions by juries.55 Kahneman and colleagues
argued that citizens have great difficulty making judgments on a dollar
scale because the scale lacks clear anchors-citizens may agree that a
defendant behaved outrageously, but how much money does it take to
53. See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 19.
54. This is mostly as an analytical nuisance, because awards data must be log-transformed
before they can be analyzed using traditional methods of statistical inference.
55. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE (2002); Daniel
Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49 (1998); David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity
Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with
Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998).
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express that outrage or deter a multinational corporation? 56 As a re-
sult, dollar judgments are likely to be much more variable across citi-
zens than the range of their views on a seven-point attitude scale
might predict. And because, in the tort context, the dollar scale is
bounded at zero, variability can only be expressed in one direction-
the larger end.
FIGURES 1A AND lB
1-
200,000 400,00 600, 0
Compensatory Award
THE HISTOGRAM ON THE LEFT SHOWS THE TOTAL JURY AWARDS
FROM SAN FRANSISCO COUNTY AND COOK COUNTY FOR THE
YEARS 1960-1999 (PROVIDED TO THE AUTHOR BY ROBERT
REVILLE AND SETH SEBURY OF RAND's INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL
JUSTICE). THE HISTOGRAM ON THE RIGHT SHOWS A SIMILAR (BUT
FAR LESS EXTREME) PATTERN FOR MOCK JUROR VERDICTS FROM A
SINGLE CASE.
5 7
Interestingly, the late paleontologist Stephan Jay Gould made a
very similar argument in his book Full House.58 Gould disputed the
widely held view that evolution has favored the development of ever-
more complex organisms, with humans at the apex. Gould argued
that the apparently increasing complexity of organisms was artifactual.
Since complexity is necessarily bounded at a low level near zero-a
niche long occupied by bacteria-a purely random process (a "ran-
56. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Economic Preferences or Attitude Expressions?: An Analysis
of Dollar Responses to Public Issues, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 203, 220 (1999); see also Cass
R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153 (2002).
57. MacCoun, supra note 48 (providing compensatory award recommendations in an unpub-
lished histogram from Experiment 2). Note the typical asymmetric pattern, bounded at zero on
the left, but unbounded on the right with a long tail.
58. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, FULL HOUSE: THE SPREAD OF EXCELLENCE FROM PLATO TO DAR-
WIN (1996).
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dom walk" in statistical terms) would inevitably produce an ever-in-
creasing right tail of complexity (see Figure 2).
FIGURE 2
Left Wall of Minimal Complexity PECAMBRIAN
Bacteria
BacteriaPRSN
PRESENT
@ .
Complexity
STEPHEN JAY GOULD'S USE OF A LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTION TO
ARGUE THAT A "RANDOM WALK" PROCESS COULD CREATE AN ILLU-
SION THAT EVOLUTION FAVORS INCREASING COMPLEXITY.
5 9
Once we recognize the form of the tort award distribution, it be-
comes apparent that it can only produce extreme awards in the right
tail-the large awards. Indeed, the only exception that comes to mind
is the one that proves the rule-a jury's tart choice to award only one
dollar to the United States Football League (USFL) in its antitrust
suit (for a half billion dollars) against the National Football League.60
2. Extremity Bias
The problem-from an inductive standpoint-is that the right tail,
by its very extremity, is bound to attract our attention. Psychologists
long ago established that the brain forms a "cortical model" of the
stimuli in the environment. We habituate to the typical range of stim-
uli, but we "wake up" and pay attention when an extreme stimulus
deviates from this range-the so-called "orienting reflex."'61 And
59. Id. at 18, 171.
60. The USFL never cashed the check, which was trebled to $3.76 plus interest in accordance
with antitrust law. Darren Rovell, Former Executive Holding Onto Monumental Check, http://
www.thisistheusfl.com/ESPN_20thChecksandBalances.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2005).
61. See YE N. SOKOLOV, PERCEPTION AND THE CONDITIONED REFLEX (Stefan W.
Waydenfeld trans., 1963).
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once beyond the act of perception, our brains continue to give ex-
treme stimuli disproportionate weight in emotion, 62 evaluative judg-
ment,63 and impression formation.64
An additional factor-more social than neurological-is suggested
by linguistic and cognitive theories of conversational pragmatics. In a
widely cited 1975 paper, Paul Grice proposed that a list of "conversa-
tional maxims" are implicitly assumed by competent speakers during a
conversation.65 His first maxim of quantity was that one should
"make your contribution as informative as is required. '66 Arguably, a
description of a typical low-stakes lawsuit is not very informative for
anyone. Of course, another of his maxims: "Do not say that for which
you lack adequate evidence," is grossly violated by tort coverage in
the media.67
3. Implications for Media Coverage
If this line of reasoning is correct, then it may not be necessary (or
even accurate) to invoke politics as an explanation for media distor-
tion of jury awards. According to this account, the media should be
preoccupied with extreme events-a claim that is hardly counterintui-
tive. But what is perhaps more novel about this account is that those
extremes should be bilateral in some domains (drawn from both tails),
but unilateral in others (drawn from one tail)-depending on the dis-
tribution in question. Table 3 offers examples of each type. I do not
attempt to cite evidence for these cases because I think they are fairly
self-evident to any consumer of the media.
62. Ap Dijksterhuis & Pamela K. Smith, Affective Habituation: Subliminal Exposure to Ex-
treme Stimuli Decreases Their Extremity, 2 EMOTION 203 (2002); see also Daniel Kahneman &
Dale T. Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its Alternatives, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 136
(1986).
63. See Russell H. Fazio et al., On the Automatic Activation of Attitudes, 50 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 229 (1986).
64. John J. Skowronski & Donal E. Carlston, Negativity and Extremity Biases in Impression
Formation: A Review of Explanations, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 131 (1989).
65. H. P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 41 (P. Cole ed., 1975);
but see DAN SPERBER & DEIRDRE WILSON, RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION
(1986).
66. Grice, supra note 65, at 45.
67. Id. at 46.
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TABLE 3
NEWSWORTHY OUTLIERS DRAWN FROM ASYMMETRICAL
AND SYMMETRICAL DISTRIBUTIONS
Asymmetrical Distributions Symmetrical Distributions
(one tail is newsworthy) (both tails are newsworthy)
Jury awards Swings in corporate earnings and stock
prices
Lottery winners Casino winners and losers
Campaign expenditures Budget and trade deficits and surpluses
Human longevity (oldest) Human height (shortest, tallest)
Most strikeouts by a baseball pitcher Most wins or losses per season, for a
baseball pitcher
Record snowfalls Record temperatures
This stimulus-based account has several attractive features. It ac-
counts for the magnitude effect (the fact that reported awards are dis-
proportionately high), the case-type effect (the overrepresentation of
product and medical cases, which produce higher damages than auto
cases), the plaintiff effect (defense verdicts cannot really be "ex-
treme"), and the trial effect (settlements are less likely to happen if
they are too extreme, and do not always get revealed to the press any-
way). It is memetic, in keeping with a growing recognition that the
formal features of a message can encourage its propagation, irrespec-
tive of any intent by the communicator or recipient. 68 And notably,
the stimulus-based account works without any political conspiracies-
or at least, in addition to any conspiracies. 69 To say this is not to argue
that the media distortion is politically neutral in its consequences. It is
68. The term "meme," by now probably familiar to most readers, was introduced by Richard
Dawkins to convey the notion that certain types of information might replicate in a manner at
least roughly analogous to genes. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976); see also
SUSAN BLACKMORE, THE MEME MACHINE (1999) (providing an enthusiastic scholarly elabora-
tion); contra DARWINIZING CULTURE: THE STATUS OF MEMETICS AS A SCIENCE (Robert Aunger
ed., 2000). Chip Heath has published a variety of studies showing meme-like transmission in the
"marketplace of ideas." See, e.g., Adrian Bangerter & Chip Heath, The Mozart Effect: Tracking
the Evolution of a Scientific Legend, 43 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 605 (2004); Chip Heath et al.,
Emotional Selection in Memes: The Case of Urban Legends, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SoC.
PSYCHOL. 1028 (2001).
69. Motivational explanations are ubiquitous in lay psychology, but since the 1970s, most pro-
fessional psychologists have preferred to explain a behavior in cognitive and situational terms
unless there is fairly direct evidence that it was specifically motivated. See RICHARD E. NIsBE-r
& LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT
(1980); LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991). But it is difficult to isolate these classes of explanations in practice,
and the differences are sometimes a matter of interpretation. See Philip E. Tetlock & Ariel Levi,
Attribution Bias: On the Inconclusiveness of the Cognition-Motivation Debate, 18 J. EXPERIMEN-
TAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 68 (1982).
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surely pernicious, distorting decisionmaking by injury victims, lawyers,
manufacturers, and government. Whether the net effect actually ben-
efits tort reformers is a question addressed in the final section.
E. But What About Tort Tales?
The pattern of distortion this article is attempting to explain is the
statistical misrepresentation of torts. But at various points I have in-
voked the media's fascination with "tort tales" as a constraint on these
explanations. It is not logically necessary for an explanation for the
statistical distortion to also explain the focus on tort tales, but it would
help. And on its face, the telling of tort tales seems to reveal a pro-
tort-reform bias. But it is easy to offer a brief sketch of why we might
be attracted to tort tales, irrespective of any political motives.
Narrative structures play a central role in human cognition, 70 and
sociolegal scholars have argued that lay people think about legal cases
by constructing stories rather than employing abstract doctrinal or
Bayesian analysis.71 Tort tales are not just comprehensible, they are
engaging and even entertaining. Incongruent or unexpected events
are particularly likely to attract our attention and to provoke
rumination. 72
In a very short narrative, they set up an expectation-surely the
jurors will see right through this outrageous legal claim-and then vi-
olate it. The fact that the outcome seems unexpectedly unfair rather
than unexpectedly fair is icing on the cake, because bad outcomes at-
tract more attention than good outcomes.73 Evolutionary psycholo-
70. See JEROME S. BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE (2002); WALTER
KINTSCH, COMPREHENSION: A PARADIGM FOR COGNITION (1998); ROGER C. SCHANK & ROB-
ERT P. ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS, AND UNDERSTANDING (1977); Tom Trabasso & Jake
Bartolone, Story Understanding and Counterfactual Reasoning, 29 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 904 (2003).
71. See W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981); Nancy Pennington &
Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L.
REv. 519 (1991).
72. D. E. BERLYNE, CONFLICT, AROUSAL, AND CURIOSITY (1960); Reid Hastie, Causes and
Effects of Causal Attribution, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 44 (1984); Achim
Schutzwohl, Surprise and Schema Strength, 24 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEM-
ORY, AND COGNITION 1182 (1998); Paul T. P. Wong & Bernard Weiner, When People Ask "Why"
Questions, and the Heuristics of Attributional Search, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 650
(1981).
73. Chip Heath, Do People Prefer to Pass Along Good or Bad News? Valence and Relevance
of News as Predictors of Transmission Propensity, 68 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECI-
SION PROCESSES 79 (1996); Tiffany A. Ito et al., Negative Information Weighs More Heavily on
the Brain: The Negativity Bias in Evaluative Categorizations, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 887 (1998).
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gists even maintain that there is an evolved "cheater detection
module" in the brain; if so, tort tales involving successful but unde-
serving plaintiffs seem particularly well suited to trigger it. 74
V. DOES MEDIA DISTORTION REALLY BENEFIT THE TORT
REFORMERS?
Recall the argument that rational actors-potential and actual de-
fendants, potential and actual plaintiffs, and their lawyers-ought to
base their tort-relevant decisions on the expected value of a lawsuit at
trial. But notice that the media is grossly overestimating that ex-
pected value, with respect to the probability of trial, the probability of
a plaintiff victory, and the size of the resulting award. So if citizens do
in fact base their expectations in part on what they learn about tort
outcomes from the media, then it follows, all this being equal, that the
media distortion is (a) increasing the rate at which citizens file law-
suits; (b) discouraging plaintiffs and their attorneys from settling out
of court; (c) informing jurors that it is "normal" to award large
amounts; and (d) discouraging producers and innovators from engag-
ing in otherwise beneficial actions. So why should tort reformers em-
brace a process that actually encourages litigation, large awards, and
overdeterrence?
One possibility, which I will acknowledge but not pursue, is that tort
reformers do not assume citizens are rational economic actors. But it
seems doubtful that anyone really believes citizens are completely im-
pervious to the expected consequences of their actions. I will also
note that it is puzzling why tort reformers highlight cases involving
deep-pocket defendants, if in fact the goal is to win support among
ordinary citizens.
But I suspect that tort reformers believe that the "greedy plaintiffs
and irrational juries" message works because of its moral content-
because it offends popular standards of equity, justice, and morality.
The problem with this as a rhetorical approach is that two messages
are being delivered simultaneously. To explain this point, it is helpful
to make use of Robert Cialdini's important distinction between in-
junctive norms (what others think I should do in this situation) and
descriptive norms (what others are doing in this situation). 75
74. See Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, in THE
ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 163 (Je-
rome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992).
75. See Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Con-
cept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015
(1990); Carl A. Kallgren et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: When Norms Do and Do
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Cialdini's focus theory of normative influence predicted that the mo-
mentary salience of each normative source (descriptive and injunc-
tive) will determine their joint influence on behavior. He and his
colleagues have tested the theory in numerous field experiments in-
volving littering of public spaces, where they have manipulated the
salience and content of injunctive and descriptive norms in the envi-
ronment and observed the effects on those passing through the
environment.
Cialdini made the provocative suggestion that many public service
advertisements may have actually backfired because they presented
descriptive normative information that conflicted with the stated in-
junctive messages. Take, for instance, the classic antilittering ad fea-
turing actor Iron Eyes Cody, in full Native American ritual garb,
tearfully eyeing a heavily littered beach, further desecrated by trash
thrown from a passing car. Cialdini argued that the poignant injunc-
tive message-littering is a tragic betrayal of our planet-may well
have been subtly undermined by the clear descriptive message: "[T]his
is how people usually behave at this beach. ' 76 The result? More
littering.
Dan Kahan offered a related argument regarding tax compliance:
When government engages in dramatic gestures to make individuals
aware that the penalties for tax evasion are being increased, it also
causes individuals to infer that more taxpayers than they thought
are choosing to evade. This inference, in turn, triggers a reciprocal
motive to evade, which dominates the greater material incentive to
comply associated with the higher than expected penalty.77
Similar concerns have been raised in the prevention literature. For
example, Dishion, McCord, and Poulin argued that interventions for
juvenile delinquency often inadvertently reinforce problem behavior
by bringing delinquent youth together in settings with few if any non-
delinquent peers.78 Finding that college students actually overesti-
mate the prevalence of binge drinking on their campus, Prentice and
Not Affect Behavior, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1002 (2000). For a related socio-
logical analysis, compare with the sociological taxonomy of first order and second order expecta-
tions, see Lisa Troyer & C. Wesley Younts, Whose Expectations Matter? The Relative Power of
First- and Second-Order Expectations in Determining Social Influence, 103 AM. J. Soc. 692
(1997). For a discussion of the relevance of the social psychology of norms for legal theory, see
Yuval Feldman & Robert MacCoun, Some Well-Aged Wines for the "New Norms" Bottles: Impli-
cations of Social Psychology for Law and Economics, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRA-
TIONAL BEHAVIOR 358 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005).
76. Cialdini et al., supra note 75.
77. Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 342 (2001).
78. Thomas J. Dishion et al., When Interventions Harm: Peer Groups and Problem Behavior,
54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 755 (1999).
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Miller argued that an important prevention strategy is to present the
behavior as statistically deviant, rather than as a growing menace. 79
Theory and research on the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic80
and on the range-frequency model also suggest that the availability or
salience of large dollar awards could inflate lay judgments.81 There
are many empirical demonstrations that the availability or salience of
large scale values can increase the magnitude of judgments about
lesser stimuli.82 In fact, some of the most striking examples involve
tort litigation, where plaintiff recommendations and caps on damages
each serve to inflate judgments in laboratory experiments. 83
But has the tort reform campaign not been a big success? It is hard
to know how to operationalize such a claim or what baseline to use for
comparison. There have been many small victories, and both Bush
administrations have featured it prominently from the bully pulpit.
But it is striking just how few of the major goals have been achieved-
we have not abandoned the contingency fee or the civil jury (unlike
England), and most jurisdictions have not adopted a loser pays rule
(again, unlike England) or caps on damages.84 Those states that have
79. Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller, Pluralistic Ignorance and Alcohol Use on Campus:
Some Consequences of Misperceiving the Social Norm, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 243
(1993).
80. See Karen E. Jacowitz & Daniel Kahneman, Measures of Anchoring in Estimation Tasks,
21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL BULL. 1161 (1995); Thomas Mussweiler, The Durability of
Anchoring Effects, 31 EUROPEAN J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 431 (2001); Tversky & Kahneman, supra
note 20.
81. See Allen Parducci, Category Judgment: A Range-Frequency Model, 72 PSYCHOL. REV. 407
(1965).
82. See, e.g., Michael R. Hagerty, Social Comparisons of Income in One's Community: Evi-
dence from National Surveys of Income and Happiness, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 764
(2000); Ronald W. Niedrich et al., Reference Price and Price Perceptions: A Comparison of Alter-
native Models, 28 J. CONSUMER RES. 339 (2001); Kimihiko Yamagishi, Effects of Response Range
in Frequency Judgments of Common Versus Uncommon Events, 82 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR
SKILLS 1371 (1996).
83. See, e.g., Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiffs Requests
and Plaintiffs Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 445 (1999); Mollie
W. Marti & Roselle L. Wissler, Be Careful What You Ask For: The Effect of Anchors on Personal
Injury Damages Awards, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 91 (2000); Jennifer K. Robben-
nolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive
Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353 (1999). For examples involving criminal sentencing, see
Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects in the
Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1535 (2001); Michelle D. St. Amand & Edward Zam-
ble, Impact of Information About Sentencing Decisions on Public Attitudes Toward the Criminal
Justice System, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 515 (2001).
84. My colleague Stephen D. Sugarman argues that "[a]fter 30 years of fighting, although
most States have engaged in some statutory reform, the overall pattern across the nation is
something of a crazy quilt, with different States adopting very different parts of the defence
package." Stephen D. Sugarman, United States Tort Reform Wars, 25 U. NEW S.WALES L.J. 849,
852 (2002).
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capped either or both damages and contingency fees may have re-
duced litigation rates, 85 and surveys indicate that many jury pool
members share tort reformers' jaundiced views of plaintiffs, attorneys,
and runaway juries.86 But it is not clear to what extent these views
were shaped by tort reform ads or media coverage.
An experiment by Elizabeth Loftus did find that mock jurors who
were exposed to tort reform ads recommended significantly (but not
dramatically) smaller awards than those in an unexposed condition. 87
But because actual reform ads were used, the injunctive message
(large awards are bad) and the descriptive message (large awards are
increasingly common) were confounded. In a later study, Greene,
Goodman, and Loftus found a significant positive correlation between
jury-pool members beliefs about the frequency of large jury awards
and their subsequent award recommendations in a mock trial:
"[J]urors who believed that million dollar awards were common
tended to award more, not less."' 88 To the extent that messages be-
come dissociated from their sources, and from each other, over time,
it is conceivable that the descriptive norm content of a tort reform ad
has a delayed and diffuse effect that is independent of its moral disap-
probation.8 9 Moreover, even if jurors are persuaded by the injunctive
message, prospective plaintiffs and their attorneys seem more likely to
attend to the enticement of the descriptive message. 90
VI. CONCLUSION
Thus, distortion in tort reporting may have several simultaneous ef-
fects, and these effects are in tension. The injunctive message that
"the system is irrational and unfair" may be advancing tort reform in
85. See Patricia M. Danzon, The Effects of Tort Reforms on the Frequency and Severity of
Medical Malpractice Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 413 (1987); Patricia Munch Danzon & Lee A.
Lillard, Settlement out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 345 (1983).
86. See Edith Greene et al., Jurors' Attitudes about Civil Litigation and the Size of Damage
Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 805 (1991); Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments
of Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAw &
Soc'y REV. 85 (1992).
87. Elizabeth Loftus, Insurance Advertising and Jury Awards, 65 A.B.A. J. 68 (1979).
88. Greene et al., supra note 86, at 813.
89. See ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATrITUDES 612 (1993);
G. Tarcan Kumkale & Dolores Albarracin, The Sleeper Effect in Persuasion: A Meta-Analytic
Review, 130 PSYCHOL. BULL. 143 (2004).
90. One might expect plaintiffs' attorneys to lower their clients' unrealistic expectations. But
attorneys tend to overestimate the likelihood of prevailing at trial. See Craig R. Fox & Richard
Birke, Forecasting Trial Outcomes: Lawyers Assign Higher Probability to Possibilities That Are
Described in Greater Detail, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (2002); Elizabeth F. Loftus & Willem
A. Wagenaar, Lawyers' Predictions of Success, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 437 (1988).
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citizen voting and state and federal legislative behavior. The descrip-
tive message that one should expect large and frequent awards may be
encouraging the filing of lawsuits, inflated settlement offers, and
overdeterrence. Because we do not yet know the magnitude of either
type of influence, we should not take for granted that the net effect of
distorted reporting benefits those who favor tort reform. If there is
even a grain of truth in conventional models of litigation behavior, it is
far from clear why tort reformers should unequivocally welcome, or
why the plaintiffs' bar should decry, media coverage that exaggerates
the public view that lawsuits (especially those involving products or
doctors) have a good chance of going to trial and providing plaintiffs
with a victory and a very large award.
